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NOTES.
CARRIERS-LOSS OF GOODs-No DECLARATION OF VALUE-The

rule that a common carrier may not relieve itself by contract from
liability for loss or damage to goods due to its negligence is now
generally accepted,' yet even with the courts professing to follow it
there is a tendency to limit recovery against the carrier to the
amount agreed upon between the carrier and the shipper as the
value of
the shipment, though loss occurs through the carrier's neg2
ligence.
A recent case in the Supreme Court of O~klahomax raises the
question of the validity of contracts limiting liability for negligence.
An express company accepted i trunk for transportation from a
point in one state to a point in another, with notice from the shipper
of the value of the contents, without requiring a written declaration
of value and without issuing a receipt limiting the valuation of the
"Armstrong v. U. S. Express Co., 159 Pa. 64o (1894) ; Pierce v. Southern
Pac. Co., x2o Cal. x56 (1898).
'Richmond v. Payne, 86 Va. 48z (x89o); Smith v. American Express
Co.,
io8 Mich. 572 (895); Ulhman v. C. T. N. W. R. Co., 112 Wis. 150
"(zgoa).
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property in case of failure to deliver. The court held that the shipper was entitled to recover the reasonable value of the property
lost.

The court said: "From the fact that the company had a tariff
of rates approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, notice
of which was posted in its office, the law did not imply a contract of
shipment at the minimum rate and at a released valuation . ..
The approved tariff authorized the company to enter into a contract
of shipment by which its liability might be limited to the express valuation named in the contract of shipment, but when the company
accepted the trunk for shipment, with notice from the shipper of the
value of its contents and did not require an express declaration of
value, then the law made a contract for the parties whereby the obligation was imposed upon the company to safely deliver the property within a reasonable time and placed the obligation on the shipper to pay the tariff rate according to the value of the property
shipped."
It is clear that if a shipper requests and receives a certain service, lie is bound thereby to pay the rateschleduled for that service, regardless of his knowledge of the rate or of any inconsistent contract
made by the carrier with him.' It is usually said that the shipper
has notice of the appropriate rate by reason of its being on file with
the Commission. As a matter of fact, the shipper in such a case has
no notice of any kind, but in order to insure that every shipper receivii- tie same service shall pay the same rate, and so prevent discrimination, the law binds each to pay the legal rate, regardless of
notice or lack of notice.' Taking literally this misleading phrase,
"presumed to have notice", it may seem logical to say if a shipper
has notice of a rate by the filing of it, he also has notice of the grade
of service, a limitation clause or what might be called an offer for a
valuation agreement, provided that is filed. And so the Supreme
Court of the United States in Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker"
held that because the carrier has filed a regulation with the Interstate Commerce Commission as to how the agreed value shal be
reached, the shipper is affected with constructive notice of the regulation and that therefore where he fails to declare a greater value he
can be said to have agreed or represented that the goods are worth
only a limited amount. And further, if this regulation as to the
manner of valuation is unreasonable, the court holds that it cannot
be directly
be declared invalid in a collateral proceeding, but must
attacked before the Interstate Commerce Commission.t
' American Express Co. v. Merten, 141 Pac. Rep. 169 (Old. 1914).
'Gulf, Colorado, etc., Ry. v. Hefly, is8 U. S. 98 (1895); Texas & Pacific
Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242 (19o5).
'Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155 (1911).
Boston & Maine Ry. v. Hooker, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526 (1914).
'T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Company, 2 U. S. 426 (19o6);
Clement v. T. & N. R. Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 979 (xgo7).

NOTES

The issue then is what kind of service did the shipper receive.
Since legally the only type of service is one with unlimited liability
unless an agreement or statement of valuation is made by the shipper, he cannot be said to have requested,8 or in fact to be entitled to
limited service without the creation through constructive notice of
an act on his part. Such a result as was reached in the Hooker casep
is a radical and unjust extension of the doctrine. If followed out
logically, it would allow common carriers to make use of an advantageous position to overreach their patrons. They might discard their present lengthy bills of lading, issue simple receipts and
still bind the shipper without his knowledge by the mere filing of
regulations with the Commission.
It is a settled rule that the normal shipment is with liability for
the entire value of the goods.1 0 Carriage with limited liability, is an
exceptional service which exists only when the shipper by shipping
on a certain agreed or represented valuation has estopped -himself to
assert a greater value. This point was decided in the case of Hart v.
Pennsyltania.R. R. 11 and has subsequently been followed in many
jurisdictions. 1 2 And, it now represents the prevailing view. Nevertheless, in a few states, its soundness is questioned and a contrary rule
established. 1 '
The result of the Hart case 14 is to relieve the carrier from obligation to pay to the shipper the full value of the goods and that too,
though the loss has happened through the carrier's negligence. Since
the general rule forbidding the limitation of liability for negligence
is well established, it is important to seek the reason for this conclusion. The Hart case and others in accord With it15 suggest estoppel
It is clear that
as the foundation upon which they may be rested.
where the shipper to secure a lower rate misrepresents the value and
the carrier is misled by sucf misrepresentation, and loss occurs in
consequence of the lower valuation, a case is presented to which the
principle of estoppel applies. In the Hart case the carrier knew
the true value of the goods shipped. Some cases, however, disclose
'"There can be no limitation of liability without the assent of the
shipper." Can. v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co, 194 U. S. 42 (1903).
I Boston & Maine Ry. v. Hooker, supra, ni. 6.

"The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375 (1896).

"Hart v. Pennsylvania R. RL, 112 U. S. 375 (1896).
Duntley v. Boston & Me., 66 N. H. 263 (i8go); Smith v. American
Express Co., io8 Mich. 572 (3896); Loeser v. Chicago, etc., .. Co., 94 Wis.
571 (i896); Graves v. Adams Express Co., 176 Mass. 28o (i90o); Georgia
Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 12r Ga. 231 (194).
"Baughman v. Louisville R. L, 94 Ky. x5o 0893); Hughes v. P. 1R.R

Co., =oa Pa. 2= (1902).
"Hart v. Pa. R. R. Co., jupra, n. Ii.
uHart v. Pa. R. R. Co., supra, v. i; Graves v. Lake Shore R. L, x3i
Mass. 33 (1881); Georgia Ry. Co. v. Johnson, supra, n. x3.
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all these facts and are properly rested on estoppel.2' Since estoppel
arises only where there is a misrepresentation, it would seem that it
can play no proper part when the carrier knows the true value of the
goods shipped and is consequently not misled by the shipper's valuation. Estoppel, therefore, has a proper place only where the carrier
does not know that the true value is misstated..
If the estoppel theory is unsound, the reason can apparently be
rested only on the basis of contract. Here, again, if the carrier
knows the true value of the goods shipped, it is not easy to understand on what theory to support the conclusion reached in the cases.
Since the carrier and the shipper are both aware of the true value of
the goods shipped, the placing of a lower valuation thereon is a patent effort to absolve the carrier from a portion of his liability. The
courts agree that where the stipulation is in form a limitation of liability to a specified amount, such limitation will not be upheld in
cases of negligence and why a different result should be reached because the parties with full knowledge of the facts decide upon an
agreed valuation is one for which we cannot give a reason. It is true that the cases have not turned on the question of the
carrier's knowledge or ignorance of the true value." Such ignorance or knowledge on the part of the carrier of the true value of
the goods should constitute we believe, the decisive factor in determining the validity or invalidity of a stipulation as to agreed valuation
where the loss occurs through negligence. The carrier's duty should
be to ship only at the true value, where known, since attempted limitation of liability to a fixed sum is not permissible. If the courts
sustain contracts of this kind entered into with full knowledge on
both sides of the true value, simply because they take the form of
agreed valuation, an important exception has developed to the general rule forbidding contracts by common carriers limiting liability
for fiegligence.
Clearly, as a mode of protecting the carriers against false valuations and of liquidating the damages in advance, au agreed valuation commends itself to everyone. Since value is a matter of opinion
where such agreed value is reasonably close to the true value, courts
might hold the spirit of the rule forbidding limitation of liability for
negligence is not violated by upholding such agreed valuation. Accordingly some cases have made the validity of the valuation depend
solely on its approximating with reasonable accuracy the true value
of the goods."
"Everett v. Southern Express Co., 46 Ga. 303 (1872); Oppenheimer v.

U. S. Express Co., 69 111. 62 (1873).
" Reference thereto has frequently been made. Southern Express Co. v.
Everett, 3! Ga. 688 0x868): Baughman v. Louisville R. R., 94 Ky. i~o (1893).
In some cases it has been distinctly repudiated as an essential element. Douglas Co. v. Minn. Transfer Ry. Co.. 62 Minn. 281 (T895), where the decision
is made to turn on the fairness of the valuation.
UMurphy v. Wells, Fargo & Co., xo8 N. W. Rep. 1070 (Minn. i9o4);
Nashville Ry. Co. v. Heikens, 79 S. W. Rep. io3 (Tenn. 19o4).

NOTES

The further question arises as to whether the provision of the
Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act" has the effect of changing the rule laid down in the Hart case.20 The cases
hold very generally, however, that the Carmack Amendment does
n t deprive the carrier of the right to make a fair contract with the
shipper, fixing an agreed valuation upon the goods to be transG.W.K.
ported.21

CORPORATIONS-POWER TO ACT AS ACcOMMODATING INDORSER-

In Pennsylvania, for the first time, the precise question whether a
corporation will be liable on its endorsement of a promissory note
when such endorsement was for accommodation, and the paper
passes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value before maturity without notice of the character of the endorsement, has been
passed on by the Supreme Court, and decided in the affirmative. The
Court took the position that a corporation having either express or
implied power to issue negotiable paper is presumed to act within the
scope of that authority and that therefore there was nothing to put
the holder on notice that the endorsement was irregular, and consequently he is entitled to recover.'
The first question to be considered is when the power to issue
negotiable paper may be implied, and on this point there is an interesting difference of judicial opinion between the courts of England
and those of the United States. the latter being far more lenient. In
England a corporation has not, as one of the mere incidents of its
existence, the power to make notes, accept bills of exchange, etc.
The rule is that unless the nature of the business in which a corporation is engaged raises a necessary implication of the existence of
such a power, it does not exist, and it seems that a corporation whose
business does not require the issuing of negotiable paper under
ordinary circumstances has no implied authority to issue such a
paper tinder any circumstances whatever. The reason for the rule
as stated by Chief Justice ErIe in Baternan v. Mid Wales Railway
Conpan. 2 is this: "The bill of exchange is a cause of action by
itself, which binds the acceptor in the hands of any endorsee for
value; and I conceive it would be altogether contrary to the principles of the law Which regulates such instruments that they should be
valid or invalid according as the original consideration between the
parties was good or bad,-or whether in the case of a corporation,
" Act of Feb. 4, i887, c. 1o4, §20, 24 Stat. 386, U. S. Comp. St. igox, as
amended by Act of June 29, zg06, c. 3591, §7, 34 Stat. 593, U. S. Comp. St.
Supp. 1911.

"Hart v. Penna. R. R., supra, . Ii.
Albert Bernard v. Adams Express Co., 205 Mass.

254

(xgio); Adams

Express
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (1912).
1
Cox and Sons Co. v. Northampton Banking Co., 245 Pa. 418 (1914).

'L. . z C. P. 499 (Eng. z866).
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the consideration in respect of which the acceptance is given is sufficiently connected with the purposes for which the acceptors are incor-

porated. Some bills might be given for a consideration which was
valid, as work done for the company, and others as a security for
money obtained on a loan beyond their borrowing powers. It would
be a precarious thing to hold that, in respect of the former, the corporation might be sued by the endorsee, in the latter, not." This
ground appears somewhat narrow and technical but the sentiment of
the English courts has apparently been that it was necessary to draw
the line somewhere and that this was a convenient place. Acrdingly it has been held in England that the right to issue negotiable
paper cannot be implied from the business of a railway company,3 a
gas company," or a water works company,' but such a power has
been allowed a financial company.' The English Companies Act,
1862,.however, left any company formed under its provisions at liberty to assume the power to issue negotiable paper in its memorandum or articles of association. In the United States, as noted above,
the courts are far more prone to imply this power than in England,
the theory being that the issuing of negotiable paper is merely a
means of accomplishing the chartered purposes of a corporation.
The power has been implied from that of borrowing money,* acquiring property,' or from that of making contracts generally.? This
broad ground is that every corporation has the power, even though
not expressly granted, of making contracts to effectuate any of the
purposes of its creation, and that the power to contract inevitably involves the power to create a debt, which in turn gives rise to the
power to issue negotiable paper. Although technically this appears
somewhat less accurate than the English theory, it is submitted that
it is calculated in a much greater degree to effectuate the purposes
for which corporations are formed. Accordingly the-courts of the
various states have held that railroad," mining,' 2 and manufacturing
corporations 11 of any description may issue negotiable paper without
having the power to do so expressly granted in their charters.
'Bateman v. Mid-Wales Ry. Co., supra, n. 2.
"Bramah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963 (Eng. x837).
*Neale v. Turton. 4 Bing. 149 (Eng. 1827); Broughton v. Manchester
Water Works Co, 3 Barn. & Adol. i (Eng. i819).
'In re Land Credit Company of Ireland, L. R. 4 Ch: 460 (Eng. i869).
'Peruvian Railways Co. v. Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co.,
L. R. 2 Ch. 617 (Eng. x867).
' Richards v. Merrimack & Connecticut River R. R. Co, 44 N. H. x27
(t862).
' Meade v. Keeler, 24 Barb. 2o (N. Y. 1857).
10Watt's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 370 (1875).
"Lucas v. Pitney, 27 N. J. L, 221 (1858) ; R. R. Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall.
412 (U. S. 1868).

Mees v. Rossie Lead Mining Co., $ Hill 137 (N. Y. 1843).

NOTES
The next question to be considered is whether a corporation can
be bound by its signature on the note of another person for the accommodation of the latter. Subject to the exceptions mentioned
infra, the rule is well established that the corporation is not bound,
and the reason is that the directors are authorized by the stockholders to do business for corporate purposes, but are not authorized to
use the corporation to perform acts of friendship for others. Accordingly the general rule is that the accommodation endorsement,
signature or guaranty of a corporation is illegal and cannot be enforced.1" But, in accord with the principal case an exception is made
in the case of bona fide holders,12 provided that the corporation in
question had the power, express or implied, to issue negotiable notes.
The reason as stated by Judge Hoar of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts"6 follows: "The doctrine of ultra vires has been
carried much farther in England than the courts of this country
have been disposed to extend it, but with just limitations, the principle cannot be questioned, that the limitations to the authority, powers and liability of a corporation are to be found in the act creating it.
And it no doubt follows that when powers are conferred and defined
by statute, everyone dealing with the corporation is presumed to
know the extent of those powers. But when the transaction is not
the exercise of a power not conferred on a corporation, but the abuse
of a general power in a particular instance, the abuse not being
known to the other party, the doctrine of iltravires does not apply."
But if the note were given by a corporation which was prohibited by
its charter from so doing, or by one in which the power to give notes
could not be implied, it would be void in the hands of the payee and
all subsequent holders becase all persons dealing1 Twith a corporation
are bound to take notice of its chartered powers.
It is'interesting to note that notwithstanding the general rule on
the subject, which is in accord with that laid down in the principal
case, there is no rule of public policy which prohibits an accommodation endorsement of commercial paper by a corporation. Consequently, if such an endorsement is made with the knowledge and consent of all the directors and stockholders, and creditors' rights are
not affected, the endorsement is valid and enforceable* t
.W.L.
Monument National Bank v. Globe Works, rot Mass. 5 (1869);
cf. Timberlake v. Order of Golden Cross, 2o8 Mass. 422 (191r).
13 Cook on Corporations (6th Ed.) 2683; Culver v. Reno Real Estate
Co., 9i Pa. 367 0879); Park Hotel Co. v. Fourth National Bank, 86 Fed.
Rep.742 (1898).
Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494 (1867); National Bank of Commerce v.

Sancho Packing Co., z86 Fed. Rep. 26o (i9ui).
"Monument National Bank v. Globe Works, supra, n. 13.
"Elliott Nat. Bank ;. Western, etc., R. Co., 2 Lea 676 (Tenn. 1879).
=Murphy v. Arkansas, etc., Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 723 (899); Martin v.

Niagara, etc., Co., z22 N. Y. 6S (89o); cf. Goss & Co. v. Goss, 147 App. Div.
698 (N. Y. .91).
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EVIDENcE-TRAILING BY BILOODIiO Ds--The method of trailing criminals by bloodhounds has given rise to the interesting question as to the admissibility of such a transaction as a means of identifying the perpetrator of a crime. Notwithstanding the antiquity of
the practice, 1 the subject apparently did not come before the courts
until quite recently. In what appears to be the earliest reported decision, 2 evidence of the trailing of a suspected murderer by a bloodhound was admitted without much discussion. Shortly afterwards, it
was held that "It is a matter of common knowledge and therefore a
matter of which courts will take judicial notice that bloodhounds are
possessed of a high degree of intelligence and acuteness of scent, and
may be trained to follow human tracks with considerable certainty

and success, if put upon a recent trail."'
Although most authorities' are in favor of the admission of
"Bloodhound evidence" when certain conditions precedent have been
satisfied, its dangerous character has been universally recognized.
Thus, in the leading case of Pedigo v. Conmonwealth,5 in which the

court admitted such evidence, it is stated in the majority opinion that
"It is well known that the exercise of a mysterious power not possessed by human beings begets in the minds of many people a superstitious awe like that inspired by the bleeding of a corpse at the touch
of the supposed murderer, and that they see in such an exhibition a
direct interposition of divine providence in aid of human justice. The
very name by which the animal is called has a direct tendency to en-

hance the impressiveness of the performance, and it would be dangerous in the extreme to permit the introduction of such testimony

in a criminal case under conditions which did not fully justify its
consideration as a circumstance tending to connect the accused with
the crime."
While there are conflicts of opinion regarding the preliminary
elements requisite to the admissibility of "bloodhound evidence" it
is clear that those courts which permit its introduction are seeking
merely to establish a proper foundation and to provide adequate safeguards therefor. Preliminary to the admission of such testimony,
1

"Bloodhounds, or as they are sometimes termed, sleuthhounds, have

been employed since the times of the Romans in pursuing and hunting human

beings, and a small variety, known as the Cuban bloodhound, was used to
track fugutive negroes

in slaveholding times."

Encyclop edia Britannica

(rIth Ed.) Vol. VIII, p. 378.
2 Hodge v. State, 98 Ala. io (i893).
'State v. Tall, 3 Ohio N. P. 125 (1896).

'Davis v. State, 47 Fla. 26 (igo4); Pedigo v. Commonwealth,

203

Ky.

Parker v. State, 46 Tex.
Crim. 462 (i9o4) ; Underhill, "Criminal Evidence" §374 (a).
sSupra, n.4.

41 (1898); State v. Rasco. 238 Mo. 535 (92i,);

1 Duffy. J., in dissenting opinion to Pedigo v. Commonwealth, sura, I. 4,
said: "It is true that the majority opinion so restricts such proof and requires so many conditions precedent, that, if the opinion in question should

NOTES
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the bloodhound in question must be shown to have been trained to
follow human beings by their tracks and scent and to have been
tested, on other occasions, as to its accuracy and acuteness., It must
appear that the person in control of the dog and who is testifying
about him is reliable.' Also, the dog must have been placed upon the
trail at a point where the circumstances tend clearly to show that the
guilty person has been and has made the trail.' Some authorities
require that the pedigree of the dog be proved. 10 As a general rule,
the facts as to the tracking by a bloodhound will not be admitted, unless corroborated by measurements of the footprints or by some
other evidence concerning the identity of the accused. 1 .

The case of Brott v. State'12 has been regarded as contrary to the
weight of authority." Whether or not the court's opinion, which
disapproved of the rule existing in most states, is dictum," it is, nevertheless, "forcible and calculated to excite great caution, if not entire distrust."15 The court criticises the common belief as to the capacity of bloodhounds as a "delusion which abundant actual e'xperience has failed to dissipate." The effect of the admission is vividly
pictured as *follows: "If such evidence were held to be legal evidence, it would, standing alone, sustain a conviction, and courts in
this golden age of enlightenment, would now and again be under the
humiliating necessity of adjudging that some citizen be deprived of
his property, his liberty, or his life, beca e,_forsooth, within twentybe strictly adhered to, no great injustice would very often result from evidence admitted under the ruling in question."
'State v. Adams, 8S Kan. 435 (1911).
' State v. Rasco, supra, n. 4.. It cannot be shown on cross-examination
that other dogs owned by the same man were unreliable. Simpson v. State,
Iir Ala. 6 (1896). But a witness may compare the dog in question with
other dogs he has seen perform, in order to show his qualification to have
an opinion as to when a dog has been properly trained. Gallant v. State,
167 Ala. 6o (igio).
'State v. Moore, z29 N. C. 494 09or).
" State v. Hunter, 143 N. C. 6o7 (19o7) ; State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio,
34 (1907); contra, Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 166 (i9o8); Chamberlayne,
"Modern Law of Evidence," Vol. 3, z76o. In the only civil case, in which
the question has arisen, it was held that in an action for unlawful search for
stolen goods, evidence that bloodhounds trailed to the plaintiff's house was
admitted solely for the purpose of mitigating damages, by showing want of
actual malice. It was held, however, that it was error to admit testimony
laudatory of the pedigree training and usefulness of the dogs in question.
McClung v. Brenton, x23 ia. 368 (1904).
"Cases cited in n.5; contra, State v. Hall, supra, n. 3; dictum in State
v. Freeman, 146 N. C. 615 (igo8).
70 Neb. 395 (1903).
"Wigmore on Evidence, VoL 5, p. 22.
The opinion states: "The conduct of the dogs was, perhaps, rightly
received in connection with an admiission made by lBrott, as evidence tending
to prove that he committed the crime charged." The court added that such
evidence was incompetent to prove independent crimes to which the admis-

sion did not relate.
"Price, j., in State v. Dickerson, upra, n.1o.
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four or forty hours after the commission of a crime, a certain dog
indicated by his conduct that he believed the scent of some microscopic particles supposed to have been dropped by the perpetrator of
the crime, was identical, or closely resembled, the scent of the person
who had been accused and put upon trial."
In the recent case of People v. Pfanschmidt, the question as to
the competency of "bloodhound evidence" again arose and was decided in the negative. The facts of the case are unique. A bloodhound was given the scent from a horse track, made thirty hours before, at the scene of the murder of which the defendaht was accused.
It took up the trail for a short distance and was then carried in an
automobile until within short distances of crossroads where it was allowed to get out and again pick up the scent. The hound trailed to
the defendant's buggy standing outside his stable, then went to his
house and finally returned to the stable where he lay down behind a
particular horse belonging to the defendant. The court in rejecting
this eidence said: "Neither court nor jury can have any means of
knowing why the dog does one thing or another in following in one
direction instead of in another; that must be left to his instinct without knowing upon what it is based. The information obtainable on
this subject scientific, legal, or otherwise, is not of such a character
as to furnish any satisfactory basis or reason for the admission of
this class of evidence."
Although the court reached the conclusion that "testimony as to
the trailing of either man or animal should never be admitted in any
case," it was greatly influenced by the fact that many of the various
precautionary prerequisites of admissibility, which have been previonsly stated, had not been satisfied. The opinion cannot be cited
as being flatly contrary to the sound rule which has been followed practically universally, 7 since the court was obviously controlled by co'siderations which concerned the weight rather than
the admissibility of the evidence in question.
A.L.L.
HUSBAND AND

VIFE-FRAUD ON MARITAL

RxIGrs-There is

little question that at common law a woman cannot on the eve of or in
contemplation of marriage dispose of her property without the
knowledge of her intended spouse so as to deprive him of his legal
interest in it, because such a conveyance would be a fraud on his marital rights.' The reason for the rule is clear: since the husband was
entitled to all his wife's personalty and to the rents, issues and profits
from her realty during coverture and to curtesy after her death,
a conveyance by the wife made just before marriage would rob him
" o4 N. E. Rep. 84 (IT., 194).
Except in Brott v. State, supra, n. 12.
'Strathmore v. Bowes, i V. 22 (Eng. 1789); Downes v. Jennings, 32
Beav. 290 (Eng. 1863).

NOTES

of valuable rights which should vest in him immediately upon the

marriage. These rights in his wife's property were to compensate
him for the liability which the law imposed on him for his wife's
ante-nuptial debts, and any disposition by the prospective wife which
intentionally deprived him, without his knowledge or consent, of valuable rights which he was entitled to expect to acquire at marriage,
was clearly a fraud on his marital rights. Similarly, a conveyance of
realty by a husband on the eve of marriage would be a fraud on the
marital rights of the wife, becate it would deprive her of her dower
rights. 2 The essence of the fraud in these cases is found in the deprivation of one spouse of rights which would come into existence at

marriage, and in the making a disposal of property just before and
in contemplation of marriage which the law would not allow to be
made at any time after marriage.
When, however, the husband attempts to-dispose of his personal property just before marriage, an essentially different problem
is presented, and the rule declaring void the conveyances previously
considered should have no application. A wife on marriage receives
in her husband's personalty no such interest as in his realty or as he
in all her property, real and personal. True, she is entitled to support during coverture, to alimony in case of a divorce, and, if she
survive him, to a widow's share in the personal property of which he
dies possessed; but these rights cannot be considered as rights in his
property which she would acquire upon marriage, and hence a transit defer by him before marriage cannot be a fraud on her because
2
prives her of no rights which she would otherwise acquire.
The various Married Women's Property Acts passed during the
last century have, it is submitted, practically abrogated the doctrine
of ante-nuptial conveyances in fraud of the husband's marital rights
as far as personal property is concerned, because under these acts a
husband acquires in his wife's property no greate" rights than she in
his, and since either can freely dispose of his or her personal property after marriage,4 either should be able to do so before. There
are no English cases on this point since the passage of the Married
Women's Act in 1882, but it is taken for granted by text writers that
this is the result of that act.5 This doctrine has not been accepted by
all the States in this country, because in some cases it has been held
that a woman cannot, even after the passage of these acts, transfer
her property just before marriage without knowledge of her prospective husband. 6 A recent case which recognizes this principle and
'Leach v. Duvall, 8 Btjsh.

201

(19o4) ;-Hach v. Rollins, 158 Mo.

(Ky. i871); Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473
z82

(igoo).

M'Keogh v. M'Keogh, I. R. 4 Eq. 338 (Ireland, i8o).
'Robertson v. Robertson, 147 Ala. 3x (x9o6); Crofut v. Layton, 68
Conn. 91 (1896).
'2 Vaizey on Settlements x585; x Leading Cases in'Equity 645; 2 Por.
Eq. Juris. §920.
6 Duncan's App., 43 Pa. 67 (1862) ; Baker v. Jordan, 73 N. C. 145 (1875).
Colitra: Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521 (1879); 7 N. D. 475 (1898).
'
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draws a distinction between conveyances before and after marriage
is Windolph v. Girard Trust Co.,7 where a deed by a married woman
of her separate estate to trustees to hold for her for life and at her
death to distribute among certain beneficiaries, was held valid although its effect was to deprive the husband of the share to which he
would have been entitled had she died possessed of this property.
Justice Mestrezat, in discussing the rights of a wife in her separate
property, held: "She may sell her personal property, give it away, or
make any other disposition of it she desires during her life and he
cannot complain, for the all-sufficient reason that he has no interest
in the property. She is the owner and has absolute control over it
and hence in disposing of it during life she infringes no property
or other right of her husband. He does not sustain the relation of
creditor to his wife. If she does not die vested of it, he can never acquire any interest in the property. It is manifest, therefore, that having no iight or interest in the property as husband, there are no marital rights of which he can be defrauded by his wife's disposal of the
. The present case
property during life by gift or otherwise. .
is not a secret voluntary conveyance of her property by a party in
contemplation of marriage without the consent of her husband. That
was declared to be a fraud upon the marital rights of the other
party, abd, of course, avoided the transfer of the property as to him."
It is submitted that this decision is correct on its facts, but that
the distinction which the court attempted to draw between transfers
before and after marriage is unsound. The arguments advanced to
support the disposition after marriage apply with equal force to a disposition before marriage; in neither case should the transfer be set
aside, because in neither case is there any right which is injured.
T. R. Jr.
WILLs-DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION-The interesting
question of dependent relative revocation was brought up in a recent Pennsylvania decision.' In that case the testator, believing that
his estate would be rather small deemed the residue a suitable gift
for his executors and so willed, but later, having ascertained that after the payment of debts and legacies, there would be a residue of
more than $i5o,ooo, lie wrote a codicil, within thirty days of his
death, in which he bequeathed the residue to a charity, adding
these words: "Ift order to carry out the foregoing bequest, clause

No.

29

of my will, giving the residue to my executors is hereby ab-

rogated." The executors contended that the revocation was dependent upon the fulfillment of the bequest, but the court took the view
of the heirs that where a bequest with revocation of inconsistent bePa. 349 (1914).
'Melville'S Estate, 245
t245

Pa. 318 (1914).
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quests attached, fails not through any defect in the instrument itself,
but through the incapacity of the devisee or legatee to take, through
some statutory disability as mortmain acts, etc., the doctrine of dependent relative revocation does not apply and the decedent is
intestate as to that portion of his property.
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is an attempt on
the part of disappointed legatees to make a condition intended out of
a reason given, in order to secure to the testator his elusive "second
choice." It operates on two theories in different lines of cases. The
narrower and more legitimate application of the doctrine is to declare a revocation void if based on facts which the testator believed
to be true, but which are in fact false and which were not within
the personal knowledge of the testator.2 The plaintiffs, the executors, in the Melville cases rested on the broader view of the doctrine that in every case where there is a reason given for a revocation and that reason fails, the revocation should be void, on the
theory that the revocation was conditional upon the carrying out of
the whole purpose of the testator. In England, the courts have gone
so far on this theory, as to hold that when a man revokes an old
will, knowing he has no other, but with the intention of making another, the revocation will be considered conditional upon the execution of a new will.4 Under practically the same circumstances in a
comparatively recent case in Pennsylvania, the court would not listen to evidence tending to show that the revocation was to depend on
the making of a new will and the result of such revocation was
clearly shown by the court: "She intentionally destroyed the will,
declaring that she meant to make another. She knew what she was
doing and the effect of it and she did it aino revocandi with intention to produce that effect."'
There are two important restrictions on the working of this
doctrine, which, if worked 'out to their logical conclusion, would
limit the doctrine to cases of mistake. The first is that the facts
from which the condition is implied must be apparent on the face of

'Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. Jr. 32I (Eng. 177).
'Supra, n.z.
'Winsor v. Pratt,

2 Brod. &B. 650 (Eng. i82); Dixon v. Solicitor of
the Treasury, 21 T. L J. 145 (Eng. 19o4); as to setting up original terms
when still decipherable, although covered by unattested alterations, see In re
Knapen's Will, 75 Vt. 146 (ixo3).
'Emenuker's Estate, 28 Pa. 369 (1907), in which the new will was to
be an exact duplicate of the old, except that it was to contain bequests of
one dollar to each of testatrix's children, since she was advised that was
essential to the validity of the will. A Georgia case would limit the doctrine to cases of equivocal acts which may or may not constitute a revocation, in which case there is no revocation unless a new will is made, but the
case holds that if the will is once revoked, it cannot again be revived, no
matter what the intention of the testator may have been as to making a new
mill or setting up an unattested one. McIntyre v. McIntyre, x2o Ga. 671
(1904).
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the will and cannot be proved by facts dehors the instrument.' This
is no more than saying that the court can take into consideration
only what the testator has declared in statutory form to alter his
other expressions so declared. Why not go a step further and say
that a revocation shall not be conditional unless the testator has -said
and said in statutory form, that it should be conditional? The second
limitation is that the doctrine cannot apply when the facts on which
the revocation was based were peculiarly within the personal knowledge of the testator.' This amounts to an admission that testators
may assign as reasons for a revocation facts which they know to be
false. And there is the inherent weakness of the whole doctrine of
dependent relative revocation. There is no denying the fact that
testators are deceitful. Many a worthy charity has been saved from
bankruptcy by the political rivalry of testator and legatee, yet in revoking the bequest rashly made to his friend of former years, the
testator will invariably say, "Having at last been brought to see
things in their true light, and realizing that these worldly goods
which I have accumulated are not mine to dispose of as I will, but
that they are a noble trust, etc., it is my unpleasant duty, in order to
carry out this bequest to this charity to revoke the bequest to my
friend." One can hardly say that the revocation was dependent
upon the carrying out of the bequest. The revocation was the inportant thing and not the bequest. The Melville case s is practically
the same, except that the testator had loftier motives. As courts have
time and again argued, there is no proof that decedent would not
have preferred intestacy to the carrying out of the revoked will or
codicil.$
As a matter of fact, all jurisdictions agree that on the facts of
the Melville case, the doctrine should not apply, but it is impossible
to see how that is held consistently with other cases in jurisdictions
where the doctrine applies even where there is no ement of mistake. After all, when it is possible for a man to make a revocation
conditional in terms"0 there seems to be no excuse for implying one
where he does not declare the condition to exist.11
J.F.H.
Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 6x (1877); Anderson v. Williams, o4

N. E. Rep. 659 (I11.
1914).
'Hayes v. Hayes, 21 N. J. Eq. 265 (187o).
Supra, n. I.
'Dickinson v. Swatman, 4 Sw. & Tr. 2o5 (Eng. x86o), which has been
criticised in England, but followed almost everywhere else.
"In re Hamilton's Estate, 74 Pa. 69 (1873); in re Stamm's Will, 94
N. Y. Supp. 588 (i9o5), bequest conditioned on legatees' presenting no claims
against estate.
" See 49 U. OF P. L R. 21 (igoi) for a review and analysis of the leading cases on this subject. An important case since decided is Anderson v.
Williams, supra, n. 6, in which testator reduced fee to spendthrift trust.
Court refused to rule that on death of husband, on whose account the trust
was made, the revocation was void.

